2

Contentious Europeans?

The chapters that follow will examine the features of demonstrations and the characteristics of demonstrators in the seven countries covered by our study, following the outline sketched in Chapter 1. Before we move on to focus more specifically on demonstrators in Chapters 3 to 7, in this chapter, we assess the contentious potential of European citizens and how this varies cross-nationally. As such, this chapter allows us to set the scene for contextualizing the analyses to follow. In so doing, we provide an overview of the potential for political mobilization and other key attitudinal aspects within the general population in the seven countries of our study by using the established, general population European Social Survey (ESS).[1] We consider in particular four aspects: the potential for the political mobilization of Europeans, their mobilizing structures (most notably, in terms of associational involvement), their political values (particularly, left-libertarian and right-authoritarian value orientations), and their political attitudes (more specifically, political interest, satisfaction, trust, and efficacy). This will form the backdrop against which we can compare the characteristics of our sample of demonstrators in the analyses in subsequent chapters.

Protest Potentials in Europe: How Contentious are Europeans?

How contentious are European citizens and more specifically the citizens in of the seven countries included in our study? There are two key ways in which this question can be answered. On the one hand, we can look at aggregate levels of mobilization. This was done in a number of existing studies of single countries as well as in comparative analyses of protest behavior using the method of protest event analysis (Beissinger 2002; Hutter 2014a; Kriesi et al. 1995; Tarrow

1989) or by cataloging "contentious gatherings" (Tilly 1995). On the other hand, one can focus on the individual level and ask people about their past or future participation in a variety of political activities based on survey data (Barnes and Kaase 1979). Here we follow the latter approach with the aim of mapping the potential for mobilization in our seven countries.

Table 2.1 shows the share of people in the seven countries who said that they had taken part in various forms of political participation. They include, in addition to electoral turnout, some of the most common ways citizens have at their disposal to make their voice heard: contacting politicians or government officials, working in political parties or action groups, working in other kinds of organizations or associations, wearing or displaying campaign badges or stickers, signing petitions, taking part in demonstrations, and boycotting certain products.[2] In addition, like all of the others in this chapter, this table shows distributions pertaining to several points in time, using the cumulative dataset that includes seven rounds of the ESS data.[3] This confers robustness to the findings, as a single survey wave could be subject to some specific contingent event affecting the data, but it also allows us to show trends over time in the patterns of participation and other aspects considered in this chapter.

The top section of the table shows that, when compared to the other forms, voting is by far the most widespread means through which citizens make their voice heard. While these figures are likely to overestimate actual turnout due to the well-known phenomenon of social desirability in surveys, they point to the key role voting has in contemporary democratic societies. In all seven countries, at least two-thirds of the respondents declared they have voted in the last national election. This pattern, moreover, is rather stable over time, in spite of long-term trends showing a steady decline in turnout both among established democracies and in other countries (Blais 2007). At the same time, there are quite important differences across the seven countries, with Belgium and Sweden showing higher levels relative to the UK and Switzerland. Explaining such differences is beyond the scope of this analysis. They depend on a variety of structural (e.g. national political culture, type of electoral system, compulsory voting) as well as more contingent (e.g. salience of a given election) factors.[4] What matters here for our present purpose is that the potential for electoral participation varies in important ways across countries. This is a relevant piece of information as we know that electoral politics and protest politics – ballots and barricades, to use Aminzade's (1993) apt formulation – are related to each other (McAdam and Tarrow 2010), as we shall discuss in more detail in Chapter 4.

The political activity that interests us most, however, is obviously participation in demonstrations. The latter is viewed as "modular protest" (McPhail 2013) or part of a "modular repertoire" (Tarrow 2011), inasmuch as it is used for different purposes by different people. As such, and in spite of the increasing importance of online activism and digital politics (Bennett and

TABLE 2.1. *Potential for political mobilization, 2002–2014 (percentage of people who have done the political activities listed in the last 12 months)*

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	Total
Voted in last national election (%)								
Belgium	85.2	91.5	92.9	92.1	88.6	89.3	90.4	89.9
Italy	89.5	87.2	–	–	–	80.6	–	86.2
Netherlands	86.3	82.4	84.0	86.1	84.1	83.8	78.7	83.7
Spain	77.7	81.8	79.1	81.9	83.5	76.7	80.8	80.2
Sweden	87.0	89.1	89.0	91.1	93.9	90.5	91.7	90.2
Switzerland	69.0	67.0	66.6	64.5	63.0	66.3	67.4	66.4
UK	72.4	68.1	71.7	70.3	71.6	70.7	70.9	70.9
Contacted politician or government official (%)								
Belgium	17.8	13.5	18.5	15.3	11.7	16.1	14.4	15.4
Italy	12.0	13.6	–	–	–	15.5	–	13.6
Netherlands	14.5	13.8	14.5	14.1	17.0	14.3	17.6	15.1
Spain	12.0	12.6	12.1	10.0	13.4	13.3	16.4	12.7
Sweden	16.5	14.3	14.9	14.8	16.3	16.3	19.5	16.0
Switzerland	17.4	14.4	13.3	12.0	15.7	14.8	14.7	14.6
UK	18.2	15.0	16.7	16.9	14.8	15.2	19.4	16.6
Worked in political party or action group (%)								
Belgium	5.4	3.9	5.8	4.3	4.6	4.4	4.4	4.7
Italy	3.0	4.0	–	–	–	5.4	–	4.0
Netherlands	3.4	3.8	4.0	3.4	3.4	3.5	4.1	3.6
Spain	6.1	7.4	5.1	2.9	6.9	7.9	8.4	6.2
Sweden	5.0	3.3	5.0	4.4	3.6	4.4	6.3	4.6
Switzerland	7.8	7.0	6.0	4.9	5.8	6.4	5.8	6.3
UK	3.4	2.2	2.5	2.2	1.7	2.0	3.1	2.4

(*continued*)

TABLE 2.1. (*continued*)

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	Total
Worked in another organization or association (%)								
Belgium	23.2	15.2	25.8	21.1	19.6	18.4	19.4	20.4
Italy	7.6	8.9	–	–	–	12.6	–	9.4
Netherlands	23.1	17.2	24.3	26.2	23.4	25.7	33.7	24.8
Spain	16.7	17.7	14.0	9.5	17.6	22.1	22.0	16.7
Sweden	24.6	24.3	26.8	27.0	28.3	34.3	36.0	28.7
Switzerland	17.3	13.3	13.7	13.1	13.6	17.4	16.5	14.9
UK	9.2	8.0	9.1	6.6	6.1	7.7	8.6	7.9
Worn or displayed campaign badge/sticker (%)								
Belgium	7.4	5.2	9.6	7.0	7.0	6.5	6.6	7.0
Italy	7.3	8.2	–	–	–	10.9	–	8.6
Netherlands	3.8	5.4	3.9	5.1	3.9	3.8	5.3	4.4
Spain	9.8	11.6	7.7	4.7	10.0	10.8	11.5	9.2
Sweden	10.7	12.8	16.3	18.4	19.5	20.0	19.2	16.5
Switzerland	9.4	8.5	6.1	6.9	4.8	5.6	6.0	6.9
UK	9.8	7.5	9.3	5.6	6.2	6.0	8.9	7.6
Signed petition (%)								
Belgium	33.9	22.0	30.4	27.6	20.6	20.6	23.1	25.5
Italy	17.4	13.5	–	–	–	23.2	–	17.3
Netherlands	22.4	23.5	20.5	23.5	26.2	22.1	28.6	23.8
Spain	24.2	24.7	22.5	17.0	26.5	33.2	32.5	25.4
Sweden	40.8	48.7	44.3	47.2	37.2	43.6	43.6	43.8
Switzerland	39.4	38.2	35.6	37.7	31.8	34.1	33.2	36.0
UK	40.0	35.5	40.6	38.2	28.5	32.1	40.1	36.4

Taken part in demonstration (%)								
Belgium	8.4	6.5	7.6	7.4	6.4	5.2	7.2	7.0
Italy	11.0	11.6	–	–	–	17.3	–	12.8
Netherlands	2.9	4.4	3.0	3.3	2.8	2.8	2.9	3.1
Spain	17.5	34.0	17.8	16.0	18.3	25.9	23.2	21.4
Sweden	6.4	7.6	4.8	6.5	4.9	7.3	11.0	6.9
Switzerland	7.9	8.8	7.2	7.7	3.9	4.4	5.5	6.7
UK	4.4	3.7	4.4	3.8	2.4	3.1	5.7	3.9
Boycotted certain products (%)								
Belgium	12.8	9.9	10.5	11.2	9.2	11.3	15.1	11.4
Italy	7.6	7.1	–	–	–	12.0	–	8.5
Netherlands	10.4	8.3	9.3	9.4	10.1	12.1	14.6	10.6
Spain	8.0	14.0	10.1	7.9	11.6	17.5	17.2	12.1
Sweden	32.5	34.8	30.6	37.3	35.6	42.8	47.5	37.2
Switzerland	31.4	24.9	28.5	25.0	27.4	28.2	28.5	27.7
UK	26.1	20.6	23.7	24.2	19.3	18.5	24.0	22.3

Note: Design weight has been applied.
Source: ESS (cumulative dataset).

Segerberg 2013; Earl and Kimport 2011; Gerbaudo 2012; Trottier and Fuchs 2015), demonstrations can be considered as the archetypical form of contentious politics today, the one that most typically characterizes the activities of social movements throughout the globe and historically over time.

Participation in demonstrations varies strongly from one country to another, as is also shown when looking at measures based on protest events (Kriesi et al. 1995). If we look at the average percentages over the entire period, Spain is clearly the context in which this form of protest is most often adopted by citizens, followed by Italy. The Spanish situation is noteworthy in this respect: one Spaniard out of five has taken part in a demonstration during the 12 months prior to the interview. On the opposite end, British and Dutch citizens are the least contentious as far as this form of participation is concerned: less than 4 percent of citizens declare that they have attended a demonstration in the previous year. Belgium, Sweden, and Switzerland stand somewhere in between with similar figures, but closer to the lower levels of protest of the British and Dutch than to the contentious Spanish and Italians. This yields a relatively clear pattern whereby we observe three groups of countries, from the most to the least contentious: Italy and Spain at the top; Belgium, Sweden, and Switzerland in the middle; and the UK, and the Netherlands at the bottom.[5] These differences more or less reflect common understandings of the extent and popularity of protest behavior in these countries. Again, it is not our purpose here to explain such differences in participation cross-nationally. The crucial point is that results point to varying protest potentials cross-nationally, and this factor will be taken into consideration when analyzing our data in the following chapters.

It is also relevant to examine how participation in demonstrations has evolved over time. Overall, there are no dramatic changes during the 12 years covered by the data, as the proportions and the ranking of the countries remain more or less the same at the start and at the end of the period. However, we also observe some trends and shifts over time. For example, in Belgium and Switzerland participation seems to have declined, whereas in the UK Spain, and especially Sweden it has increased and in the Netherlands it has remained rather stable (the missing rounds prevent us from extrapolating trends for Italy). Furthermore, the Spanish case is characterized by some important fluctuations, such as a strong increase in 2004 and also in 2012. This increase may be related to the protests against the US intervention in Iraq in 2003 (Walgrave and Rucht 2010) and as a response to the economic crisis and austerity measures in 2011 and 2012, including the emergence of the *Indignados* movement (Calvo 2013; Castañeda 2013; Romanos 2013).

The patterns of participation in demonstrations reflect the different protest traditions, but also varying political opportunity structures, in those countries. Yet, while mass demonstrations play a key role in the contemporary repertoires of contention (Tarrow 2011; Tilly 1986, 1995), other forms of participation are also available to citizens. Four of them seem particularly

relevant today: contacting the political elites, working in some kind of political organization (including parties) or campaigning for some political cause, signing petitions, and engaging in political consumerist activities such as boycotting certain products. The potential for mobilization should be assessed not only with respect to participation in demonstrations, but also in these other forms which may be used in conjunction or in substitution. Let us briefly discuss each of them.

Contacting is quite a popular political activity in all seven countries as, on average, about 15 percent of the respondents declare having done this kind of activity in the 12 months prior to the interview. Furthermore, cross-national variations are quite small, suggesting that context does not influence this form of participation as much as it does, for example, for demonstrations. There seems to be a hard core of people committed to using this channel which is available in all liberal democracies. Yet, the inclination to use this form is higher in the countries characterized by a lower participation in demonstrations suggesting that whereas some systems are more likely to encourage contentious behavior, others favor participation through more institutional means.

Three specific kinds of activities – working in a political party or action group, working in another organization or association, and wearing or displaying a campaign badge or sticker – can be considered as belonging to the same underlying mode of participation, namely group or party activities. These are rather institutional forms of participation that are used at very different rates in different contexts. Only a small share of the population is involved in party or action group activities, ranging from less than 3 percent in the UK to little more than 6 percent in Switzerland (where the existence of cantonal sections of parties might facilitate engagement). Many more are involved in work for other organizations or associations. Again, we observe important cross-country variations: while a sizable share of the population in Belgium, the Netherlands, and especially Sweden has been involved in these kinds of activities, less than a tenth have done so in the UK and Italy. We shall consider this aspect further in the next section on associational involvement. Finally, wearing or displaying campaign badges or stickers is particularly popular in Sweden and much less so in the Netherlands.

Signing petitions is quite a popular political activity. Sometimes it can be conducive to mobilizing large shares of the population. A prominent example of this is the people's petition which, back in the 1980s, was launched by the Dutch peace movement to protest against the deployment of cruise missiles in the Netherlands and which was signed by nearly four million people (Kriesi 1988b). In fact, petitions are the most frequently used political activity after voting. This is in part explained by the low degree of commitment that this form of participation requires: you just need to sign the petition. Of course, it requires that activists and campaigners do the necessary preparatory work and go out to get signatures. Yet, for people to participate in this

action they do not need to do much beyond signing for a given cause. The use of this activity varies in important ways across countries, ranging from the lowest – 17 percent in Italy – to the highest – 44 percent in Sweden. British and Swiss citizens also make frequent use of this form.[6]

Finally, boycotting certain products is a mode of action that is becoming increasingly important today. Along with buycotting – that is, buying certain products for political reasons – this is part of a mode of political action known as political consumerism (Micheletti 2003; Stolle and Micheletti 2013). The latter may be defined as the "consumer choice of producers and products with the goal of changing objectionable institutional or market practices" (Micheletti et al. 2004: xiv). As we can see, there are huge variations across countries in the use of this form of political participation. Northern and central European countries, which are more sensitive to environmental issues and ethical consumption, display larger shares of political consumerist actions than Southern European countries. We observe in particular a high amount of people who said they have boycotted certain products in the 12 months prior to the interview in the UK, Switzerland, and especially Sweden. This, along with the cross-national differences in other forms of participation, suggests that citizens in different countries place specific emphasis on certain forms of participation rather than others, privileging particular ways of making their voice heard to oppose certain policies, or promote various political causes.

MOBILIZING STRUCTURES: ARE EUROPEANS INVOLVED IN VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS?

Students of social movements have long stressed the key role played by formal and informal organizations as well as by pre-existing networks ties as conditions increasing the likelihood that citizens will engage in protest (McAdam 1999; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978). Resource mobilization theory, in particular, has put this kind of factor very much at center stage (see Edwards and McCarthy 2004 for a review). They form the mobilizing structures supporting protest behavior and contentious politics more generally (McAdam et al. 1996, 2001). Such a micromobilization context – particularly, pre-existing social networks – provides the frame for the collective interpretation of the large-scale social and cultural transformations affecting individuals in their everyday lives (through a process of collective attribution and the creation of collective identity), a rudiment of organization necessary to translate the interpretations into concrete action (through the role of leadership, communication technology, etc.), and solidary incentives to participate (through the creation of gratification relating to participation, hence allowing for the overcoming of the well-known free rider problem) (McAdam et al. 1988).

Unfortunately, the ESS does not include the standard question used to measure associational involvement. This consists in asking whether one is a member

of or has participated in activities promoted by different sorts of voluntary associations, which may have a more or less political nature (e.g. political parties, unions, peace organizations, environmental organizations, women's organizations, and so forth). So, apart from party and union membership, we must resort to a proxy consisting of a question asking how frequently one is involved in work for voluntary or charitable organizations (with answers ranging from "never" to "at least once a week").[7] Table 2.2 shows the distributions for these three indicators of associational involvement.

The figures concerning party membership reflect in part those relating to working in a political party or action group discussed earlier. Overall, only a relatively small share of the population is a member of a party. At the same time, we observe sizable differences across countries. Thus, while more than 7 percent of Swedish and Swiss citizens are members of a party, less than 3 percent of the British and Spanish are. Of course, the type of party system might explain to some extent these differences as multiparty systems such as in Sweden and Switzerland offer more opportunities to get involved in parties. Furthermore, while we do not have data for 2012 and 2014, there is a slight generalized declining trend in party membership which reflects an increasing detachment of citizens from institutional politics in recent years (Grasso 2016; van Biezen et al. 2012). We shall come back to this aspect below, when we discuss trends in political attitudes.

The share of people who are members of trade unions or similar organizations is much higher than that of party members.[8] In spite of a declining trend in the last few years, Sweden exhibits the highest levels in this respect, followed by Belgium. As is well known, Scandinavian countries, but also Belgium, have adopted the Ghent system that grants unions a key role in welfare provision – in particular, unemployment benefits – and display higher rates of unionization relative to other countries (Visser 1992). In contrast, in countries like Spain and Switzerland, but also the UK and Italy, people are much less likely to be members of trade unions or similar organizations. This reflects the relative weakness of unions in these countries.

Finally, involvement in work for voluntary or charitable organizations similarly displays important cross-national variations. Unfortunately, we only have at our disposal two rounds of the ESS, namely 2006 and 2012, which prevents us from ascertaining the in between trends over time. Even with only these two points in time, however, we can see how in certain countries a large share of the population – nearly one-third in the Netherlands and Switzerland – declare that they volunteer on a regular basis (at least once a month). In all the other countries, on average, this proportion ranges somewhere between 12 and 18 percent. This is still a good deal of people, yet much less than in the two former countries. The larger share of people involved in volunteering in certain countries, of course, might also depend on a broader supply of organizations in those countries, particularly those organizations that put grassroots participation at center stage.

TABLE 2.2. *Associational involvement, 2002–2014 (percentages)*

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	Total
Member of a party (%)								
Belgium	7.2	6.7	6.9	4.8	6.0	–	–	6.3
Italy	4.0	4.1	–	–	–	–	–	4.0
Netherlands	4.8	5.6	5.3	5.1	5.3	–	–	5.2
Spain	3.2	4.1	2.5	1.3	2.0	–	–	2.5
Sweden	8.2	6.8	6.4	6.7	7.3	–	–	7.1
Switzerland	8.8	7.4	7.4	6.1	6.9	–	–	7.4
UK	2.7	2.4	2.6	2.4	1.9	–	–	2.4
Member of trade union or similar organization (currently) (%)								
Belgium	29.5	31.5	32.5	34.0	32.6	31.0	31.6	31.8
Italy	15.2	12.4	–	–	–	14.1	–	13.7
Netherlands	20.8	20.1	18.3	16.8	19.2	17.1	16.8	18.5
Spain	7.8	7.5	8.4	7.0	9.1	–	9.5	8.2
Sweden	57.7	57.8	55.8	49.3	49.4	45.6	47.9	52.1
Switzerland	12.5	11.5	11.7	10.1	10.0	9.5	9.4	10.8
UK	18.2	14.5	16.1	15.4	14.0	13.0	15.2	15.2
Involved in work for voluntary or charitable organization (at least once a month) (%)								
Belgium	–	–	14.3	–	–	13.8	–	14.0
Italy	–	–	–	–	–	14.4	–	14.4
Netherlands	–	–	28.3	–	–	32.7	–	30.5
Spain	–	–	10.8	–	–	18.3	–	14.6
Sweden	–	–	11.7	–	–	13.3	–	12.5
Switzerland	–	–	31.0	–	–	30.9	–	31.0
UK	–	–	17.0	–	–	19.8	–	18.3

Note: Design weight has been applied.
Source: ESS (cumulative dataset).

POLITICAL VALUES: ARE EUROPEANS LEFT-WING OR RIGHT-WING, LIBERTARIAN OR AUTHORITARIAN?

Value orientations, beliefs, and ideology are the main drivers of human behavior (Rokeach 1973). More specifically, although most people do not necessarily think ideologically (Converse 1964), political values have been shown to affect political behavior and participation in important ways (Almond and Verba 1963; van Deth and Scarbrough 1995; see Halman 2007 for a review). Values set the frame for and influence action, including political action.

Students of political behavior and, more specifically, voting behavior have examined a variety of value orientations. Four of them have played a particularly central role in the literature. The first two can be seen as composing the traditional political space. Left–right orientations are by and large the most often studied value dimension (see Mair 2007 for a review). This refers to the opposition between a more leftist view stressing the planned allocation of resources and a rightist one emphasizing the spontaneous allocation of resources (Kitschelt 1994). The first supports egalitarianism and social justice whereas the second sees inequality as an incentive for spurring competition in the "free market." More concretely, this distinction refers to the traditional cleavage between left and right in the socioeconomic realm and has been historically linked to the role of social class for political behavior (see Knutsen 2007 for a review). The second traditional value orientation opposes authoritarian and libertarian values (see Esmer and Pettersson 2007 for a review). Here traditional and exclusionary values are opposed to more secular, open, and tolerant values. Authoritarians believe that women should have a secondary role in society, they oppose immigration, and have a strong belief in law and order. They are against equal rights for, and the integration of, minorities. On the other hand, libertarians believe in freedom and open social values supporting the equal recognition and standing of all groups in societies and allowing for opportunities for each to express themselves and live freely.

These value orientations – and their underlying social and political cleavages – have been challenged and developed by scholars who have stressed the emergence of new cleavages and related value orientations. Two of them deserve to be mentioned here. The materialist–postmaterialist value orientations have been popularized by the works of Inglehart (1977, 1990, 1997; see further Scarbrough 1995). In Inglehart's view, thanks to the growth of the welfare state that has made materialistic goals less crucial, and through the replacement of older cohorts with new ones, the post-World War II context in Western Europe has witnessed the rise of postmaterialist values stressing self-expression and self-realization, emancipatory and identity goals, subjective well-being, quality of life, and so forth. This view has played an important role within new social movement theory (see Buechler 1995 and Pichardo 1997 for reviews). More recently, scholarship has stressed another new line of conflict linked to what is broadly referred to as the process of globalization or, more

narrowly and perhaps accurately, denationalization (Zürn 1998). This is most often referred to as the integration–demarcation cleavage, the universalism–particularism dimension, leading to a new value cleavage opposing the winners and losers of such a process (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008, 2012).

Here we refer mainly to the left–right and libertarian–authoritarian value orientations (Evans et al. 1996; Flanagan and Lee 2003; Knutsen 1995). Kitschelt (1994, 1995) has focused on these two dimensions in his work, particularly in his definition of the competitive political space in contemporary Western Europe, crossing the opposition between socialist and capitalist politics on the one hand with the opposition between libertarian and authoritarian politics on the other hand. In terms of ultimate values, ideology, and forms of social order, Kitschelt (1994) opposes, on the former dimension, the planned allocation of resources (socialist politics) to the spontaneous allocation of resources (capitalist politics) and, on the latter dimension, fraternity with equality and liberty (libertarian politics) to fraternity without equality and liberty (authoritarian politics). In his view, the rise of the new social movements can be ascribed to a diagonal shift in the main axis of political conflict from the horizontal traditional left–right opposition to the new antinomy between left-libertarian politics and right-authoritarian politics, forming also the basis for the rise of the new radical right (Kitschelt 1995).

Where do European citizens locate themselves in the space formed by these two dimensions? In other words, how left-libertarian or right-authoritarian are they on average? Unfortunately, the ESS provides only a few measures of these value orientations. Here we use two questions, one for each dimension. The ESS questionnaire first asks people to position themselves with regard to the question whether the "government should reduce differences in income levels" (left–right dimension) and then asks whether "gays and lesbians should be free to live as they wish" (libertarian–authoritarian dimension).[9]

The overall and cross-national distributions are shown in Table 2.3. Figures represent the percentages of respondents who either agree or agree strongly with the statement. Overall, most respondents agree or strongly agree with the statement concerning left–right value orientations. Most importantly, this dimension yields rather a clear pattern: many more Italians and Spaniards believe that the state should intervene to reduce income differences than their counterparts in the other countries. In other words, in the aggregate, Italy and Spain are much more leftist than the other countries. On the opposite end, the Netherlands comes last in this ranking, with the remaining four countries standing somewhere in between. These differences have remained rather stable over time.

The pattern is somewhat more blurred for libertarian–authoritarian value orientations. Again, overall most respondents either agree or agree strongly with the statement capturing this dimension and referring to gay and lesbian rights. In terms of variations, however, we do not observe clear-cut clusters as the country differences are relatively small. The Dutch appear as the most

TABLE 2.3. *Left-libertarian and right-authoritarian values, 2002–2014 (percentages)*

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	Total
Government should reduce differences in income levels (agree or agree strongly) (%)								
Belgium	70.5	65.7	68.2	69.8	70.2	71.3	71.2	69.5
Italy	79.0	80.7	–	–	–	83.0	–	80.8
Netherlands	58.7	55.6	57.7	54.8	57.1	55.8	56.2	56.6
Spain	79.6	79.7	84.0	80.0	81.0	83.6	86.2	82.0
Sweden	68.7	66.7	67.6	64.0	63.5	68.9	67.1	66.8
Switzerland	64.6	65.2	69.9	67.0	68.1	67.6	58.5	65.9
UK	62.0	59.2	56.8	58.3	61.2	64.2	62.8	60.6
Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish (agree or agree strongly) (%)								
Belgium	80.3	79.3	80.0	84.7	87.2	85.6	86.8	83.4
Italy	72.0	64.4	–	–	–	73.4	–	69.2
Netherlands	87.9	89.2	88.5	90.9	92.8	92.5	91.9	90.4
Spain	72.2	74.0	77.3	78.3	81.5	82.6	88.8	79.5
Sweden	81.7	83.7	86.4	86.8	90.2	88.3	91.9	86.8
Switzerland	80.4	75.5	77.4	82.0	82.6	78.3	82.6	79.6
UK	75.7	75.9	78.8	81.4	84.8	83.8	85.1	81.0

Note: Design weight has been applied.
Source: ESS (cumulative dataset).

libertarian, followed by the Swedish, Belgian, British, Spanish, Swiss, and finally Italian citizens. The latter clearly are the least libertarian in this respect. However, given the deep Catholic traditionalism in Italy and the fact that we need to rely only on this one item, religious values are likely to play a role here, leading to a more conservative stance with regard to LGBTQ+ rights. In addition, these value orientations display less stability over time than the left–right orientations. We observe in particular an increase in aggregate-level libertarian values in all the countries, but especially so in the UK, Spain, and Sweden. In brief, while European citizens have remained more or less equally leftist or rightist in the last 15 years or so – with a few exceptions such as Spain and Switzerland, yet in different directions – they have become at the same time clearly more libertarian, at least as far as these limited measures are concerned.

Immigration is undoubtedly one of the most salient political issues today, one which is at center stage in the political agendas of political parties, most notably right-wing ones. Authoritarians are more likely to oppose immigration, whereas libertarians tend to support open borders and the free movement of peoples. Today, the large-scale transformations brought about by globalization or denationalization have made immigration one of the main cultural issues referring to the once religiously connotated libertarian–authoritarian dimension of the political space (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008, 2012). In addition to the two aspects considered above, we therefore also look in Table 2.4 at two indicators of value orientations more specifically referring to the place and role of immigration. The first is based on a question asking people to position themselves with regard to whether immigration is bad or good for the country's economy, whereas the second asks whether the country's cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants. Since the response items for these two questions consisted of 0–10 scales, we show means by country and year.

Clearly, Switzerland is the country where citizens, on average, are most inclined to believe that immigration is good for the economy, whereas Belgium stands on the opposite end. The UK and Sweden also display higher means, followed by Spain and, lastly, by Italy and the Netherlands. In terms of changes over time, we observe a certain stability in some countries (Belgium, the Netherlands), an increasing trend in some others (the UK, Sweden, and Switzerland), and a decreasing trend in still others (Spain), with the pattern in Italy being more difficult to ascertain due to the lack of data for certain years. As to the cultural side of immigration, Sweden stands out as the most open country, followed at a distance by the Netherlands and Switzerland, then Belgium and Spain. The UK and Italy are the more closed in this respect. In sum, just as general left–right and libertarian–authoritarian values provide a varying setting for participation in protest activities – including demonstrations – more specific immigration-related values show different mobilizing contexts in the seven countries under study.

TABLE 2.4. *Values on immigration, 2002–2014 (means)*

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	Total
Immigration bad or good for country's economy (mean 0-10 scale)								
Belgium	4.59	4.35	4.66	4.80	4.53	4.57	4.48	4.57
Italy	5.32	4.66	–	–	–	5.18	–	5.01
Netherlands	4.82	4.59	5.14	5.36	5.19	5.22	4.87	5.02
Spain	5.40	5.57	5.66	5.17	4.97	5.21	4.98	5.27
Sweden	5.46	5.02	5.37	5.48	5.95	5.60	5.78	5.51
Switzerland	5.86	5.58	5.88	6.16	6.12	6.10	6.13	5.95
UK	4.39	4.60	4.54	4.67	4.54	4.50	4.84	5.59
Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants (mean 0-10 scale)								
Belgium	5.83	5.66	5.80	5.85	5.52	5.77	5.73	5.74
Italy	5.27	4.75	–	–	–	5.61	–	5.14
Netherlands	6.06	5.83	6.08	6.15	6.13	6.26	6.05	6.08
Spain	5.86	5.93	5.82	5.71	5.91	6.21	6.01	5.91
Sweden	7.10	6.97	6.91	6.99	7.16	6.97	7.28	7.05
Switzerland	6.24	6.08	6.04	6.21	6.00	6.09	6.01	6.10
UK	5.15	5.02	4.79	4.90	4.95	5.10	4.97	4.98

Note: 0–10 scales where 0 stands for "bad for the economy" or "cultural life undermined" and 10 stands for "good for the economy" or "cultural life enriched." Design weight has been applied.
Source: ESS (cumulative dataset).

POLITICAL ATTITUDES: ARE EUROPEANS POLITICALLY DISINTERESTED, DISSATISFIED, DISTRUSTFUL, AND POWERLESS?

Political values inform the political attitudes which are the more directly observable predispositions towards politics and political objects. Here we focus on four kinds of attitudes: political interest, satisfaction, trust, and efficacy. These have all been shown to be strong predictors of participation in politics in general and protest activities in particular in previous research (Almond and Verba 1963; Barnes and Kaase 1979; Brady et al. 1995; Schussman and Soule 2005; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1978, 1995). In this case, we are more overtly interested in looking at trends over time, in addition to comparing percentages and means across countries, as these attitudes are important indicators of the underlying malaise that many scholars have noted, including an increasing alienation and detachment of citizens from politics (Dalton and Wattenberg 2002; Grasso 2016; Hay 2007; Mair 2006). In this section we examine in particular to what extent Europeans have become uninterested in politics, dissatisfied with democracy, distrustful of political institutions, and see themselves as powerless in the sense of having become increasingly disillusioned about their political efficacy.

Political interest is obviously linked to participation and is routinely included in models of political participation, whether electoral or non-electoral. Table 2.5 shows the percentage of citizens in our seven countries who declared to be either quite or very interested in politics. We observe sizable variations both across countries and over time. In terms of country differences, clearly Spanish citizens are the least interested in political affairs on average, followed by Italian and then Belgian citizens. In all three countries, less than half of the respondents said they are either quite or very interested in politics. In the other four countries, in contrast, there are more people politically interested than not. The Dutch are the most interested, followed by the Swedes and the Swiss.

The Spanish and Italian cases are quite telling in terms of citizens' disaffection with politics. There are more than twice as many people interested in politics in the Netherlands compared to Spain. Moreover, such a difference becomes even larger if we look at the data for 2002, when the ratio becomes more than one to three. This points to another important aspect regarding political interest: the important increase observed in some countries, namely Spain and Italy – as far as we can judge from the scattered data on the latter country – but also in Sweden to some extent. We also observe a significantly higher share of people interested in politics in 2014 as compared to 2002 in Belgium and the UK but here it looks like it is more a matter of ebbs and flows than a genuine trend. In contrast, the Netherlands and Switzerland display a more stable trend. Thus, in spite of the evidence that people are becoming less and less attached to politics, the spread of tertiary education and perhaps also the rise of social media could be seen to be linked to a rise in political interest to some extent. This could also be an effect of a remobilization during the years of the economic crisis and the anti-austerity protests.

TABLE 2.5. *Political interest, 2002–2014 (percentage of people who are quite or very interested in politics)*

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	Total
Political interest (quite or very interested) (%)								
Belgium	44.9	43.3	44.8	48.4	46.1	45.1	47.7	45.7
Italy	32.5	35.3	–	–	–	48.7	–	37.9
Netherlands	66.0	61.2	63.1	66.8	65.5	63.7	63.4	64.3
Spain	21.4	28.9	25.8	26.2	28.4	34.6	41.0	29.4
Sweden	57.5	57.4	61.8	58.7	61.5	58.0	67.6	60.2
Switzerland	60.6	59.1	56.6	57.9	58.9	62.0	61.4	59.4
UK	52.1	47.3	52.1	56.5	52.7	48.4	57.6	52.5

Note: Design weight has been applied.
Source: ESS (cumulative dataset).

Be that as it may, the important point here is that, in many cases, European citizens seem more interested in politics today than they were about 15 years ago.

Attitudes towards democracy are seen as an important component of political culture, particularly so in the civic culture and social capital research traditions (Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam 1993). Although the nature and direction of the relationship is far from clear, the degree and direction of satisfaction with democracy has been shown to affect participation (Farah 1979). Many studies show that countries in which citizens express higher levels of satisfaction with democracy also tend to display higher levels of voter turnout in national elections (Ezrow and Xezonakis 2016). However, one could also argue that being satisfied with the way democracy works may lead to political apathy as one does not see the need to act to change the current state of affairs. In this vein, some have found that over-time increases in citizens' satisfaction with democracy are associated with significant decreases in voter turnout in national elections (Ezrow and Xezonakis 2016). At the same time, dissatisfaction with democracy can be seen as providing a set of grievances leading people, under certain conditions, to engage in collective action and protest behavior. In the end, it might all depend on what kind of participation one is analyzing, whether electoral or non-electoral (Farah 1979). This reiterates once again the need to distinguish between different forms of participation as well as their determinants.

Table 2.6 shows the degree of satisfaction of citizens with the way democracy works in their country in our seven countries as expressed in means on a 0–10 scale, where 0 means "extremely dissatisfied" and 10 means "extremely satisfied." There is a great degree of variation in satisfaction levels across countries: the highly satisfied Swiss contrast in particular with the low satisfaction Italians, who are much more negative in this respect. The Swedes and, to a lesser extent, the Dutch are also fairly satisfied, while Belgians, British, and Spanish display lower levels of satisfaction. When we look at changes over time, we discover a twofold trend: some countries – most notably, Sweden and Switzerland, but to some extent also in the UK and the Netherlands – show an increase in satisfaction, while others – in particular, Italy and Spain, but to some extent also Belgium – point in the opposite direction. Thus, once again, the situation we find in recent years should be qualified by taking into account the evolution occurring since the early 2000s.

Perhaps even more than diminishing levels of political interest and satisfaction with democracy, discussions about citizens' political alienation have referred to a loss of political trust and to declining feelings of political efficacy (Norris 2011). On the one hand, trust in political institutions has long been seen as fundamentally linked to understandings of the legitimacy of such institutions and the political system more generally (Almond and Verba 1963; Schumpeter 1942). On the other hand, when citizens lack the feeling that their actions can have an impact and become cynical with regard to politics, this may lead to political apathy (Whiteley and Seyd 2002). However, much depends on whether we focus on institutional and electoral politics or whether we are

TABLE 2.6. *Satisfaction with the way democracy works in country, 2002–2014 (means)*

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	Total
Satisfaction with democracy (mean 0-10 scale)								
Belgium	5.52	5.56	5.49	5.17	5.20	5.86	5.30	5.45
Italy	5.01	4.78	–	–	–	4.11	–	4.67
Netherlands	5.85	5.66	6.08	6.23	6.18	6.31	6.00	6.03
Spain	5.70	6.07	5.93	5.83	5.10	3.98	4.24	5.26
Sweden	6.12	5.91	6.35	6.47	6.75	7.01	6.80	6.47
Switzerland	6.60	6.39	6.90	6.93	7.07	7.39	7.35	6.90
UK	5.08	5.14	4.93	4.88	4.97	5.58	5.17	5.10

Note: 0–10 scales where 0 stands for "extremely dissatisfied" and 10 stands for "extremely satisfied." Design weight has been applied.
Source: ESS (cumulative dataset).

dealing with non-conventional forms of participation. Indeed, citizens who are mistrustful and disillusioned by institutional and electoral politics might indicate a critical stance towards them and become much engaged in non-conventional forms of participation (Dalton 2004; Norris 1999). Research has shown that political trust is positively associated with institutional participation, but negatively associated with non-institutional participation (Hooghe and Marien 2013).

Yet, for trust to become instrumental for political participation, people must also have a sense of efficacy. Students of social movements have often stressed the important role played by individual and collective feelings of efficacy for engagement in protest activities (Opp 2013). Previous research has found this factor to be a key predictor of differential participation in social movements along with individual embeddedness in pre-existing social networks (Passy and Giugni 2001). Thus, the combination of trust and efficacy may be decisive in this respect (Andretta et al. 2015; Gamson 1968; Hooghe and Marien 2013; Seligson 1980; Watts 1973). As Andretta et al. (2015: 131) have put it, "[w]hen mistrust is not coupled with this sense of collective efficacy, it may indeed express a sense of alienation and frustration and bring about disaffection toward democratic politics." We shall come back to this point in Chapter 6 as these authors have inquired into the combination of these aspects using the same data that we are using in this book. For now, we analyze trust and efficacy separately.

Table 2.7 shows means on 0–10 scales of trust in a variety of political institutions, where 0 means "no trust at all" and 10 means "complete trust." The most relevant items for our present purpose are probably the first (trust in country's parliament), fourth (trust in politicians), and fifth (trust in political parties), that is, those referring to the national political system and their protagonists. Once again, we find variations both across countries and over time. Trust in the country's parliament is highest in Sweden and Switzerland and lowest in the UK and Italy, but it is also low in Spain, while Belgium and the Netherlands stand somewhere in between. Most importantly, the very same countries display different patterns of change over time: levels of trust have declined in Italy, Spain, and to some extent also in the UK, increased in Sweden and Switzerland, while they have remained rather stable in Belgium and the Netherlands. Interestingly, such a decline in political trust in some countries does not only concern the national legislative power, but is also reflected in diminishing levels of trust in the European Parliament. This suggests that we are dealing with a more generalized trend towards disaffection with politics at all levels.

We observe similar patterns when it comes to trust in politicians and political parties. Again, in both cases, Swedish and Swiss citizens rank highest on the level of trust. Here, however, the Dutch are even more trusting. At the opposite end, Italy and Spain, but to some extent also in the UK, display much lower levels of trust in politicians and political parties. What is most striking here are the

TABLE 2.7. *Political trust, 2002–2014 (means)*

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	Total
Trust in country's parliament (mean 0-10 scale)								
Belgium	4.99	4.68	4.99	4.57	4.46	5.02	4.84	4.80
Italy	4.83	4.41	–	–	–	3.16	–	4.21
Netherlands	5.22	4.67	5.34	5.57	5.37	5.29	5.24	5.24
Spain	4.83	5.09	5.00	5.02	4.29	3.42	3.67	4.48
Sweden	5.92	5.35	5.62	5.74	6.28	5.93	6.23	5.85
Switzerland	5.75	5.52	5.76	5.83	5.80	6.14	6.21	5.83
UK	4.68	4.29	4.20	4.32	4.11	4.28	4.34	4.31
Trust in politicians (mean 0-10 scale)								
Belgium	4.28	4.24	4.36	4.04	3.86	4.31	4.14	4.18
Italy	3.54	3.23	–	–	–	1.95	–	3.00
Netherlands	4.87	4.69	5.04	5.22	5.25	5.12	4.89	5.00
Spain	3.37	3.68	3.50	3.26	2.74	1.91	2.23	2.95
Sweden	4.72	4.19	4.46	4.62	5.04	4.74	4.97	4.66
Switzerland	4.93	4.77	4.94	4.93	5.01	5.21	5.25	4.99
UK	3.79	3.59	3.41	3.56	3.43	3.66	3.48	3.55
Trust in political parties (mean 0-10 scale)								
Belgium	–	4.29	4.36	3.99	3.85	4.23	4.13	4.14
Italy	–	3.24	–	–	–	2.00	–	2.77
Netherlands	–	4.80	5.12	5.20	5.26	5.07	4.86	5.05
Spain	–	3.67	3.46	3.21	2.71	1.88	2.21	2.86
Sweden	–	4.40	4.62	4.77	5.11	4.86	5.10	4.79
Switzerland	–	4.64	4.77	4.68	4.81	4.99	5.06	4.81
UK	–	3.68	3.53	3.63	3.52	3.69	3.53	3.59

(*continued*)

TABLE 2.7. (*continued*)

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	Total
Trust in the European Parliament (mean 0-10 scale)								
Belgium	4.88	4.98	5.15	5.14	5.03	5.12	4.83	5.02
Italy	5.54	4.88	–	–	–	4.33	–	4.95
Netherlands	4.72	4.61	4.78	5.07	4.94	4.82	4.49	4.77
Spain	4.82	5.05	5.03	4.95	4.46	3.91	3.85	4.58
Sweden	4.02	3.95	4.49	4.66	4.96	4.71	4.72	4.48
Switzerland	4.81	4.61	4.76	4.83	4.56	4.66	4.51	4.68
UK	3.64	3.55	3.49	3.60	3.36	3.43	3.15	3.43

Note: 0–10 scales where 0 stands for "no trust at all" and 10 stands for "complete trust." Design weight has been applied.
Source: ESS (cumulative dataset).

very low levels, particularly in the two Southern European countries. This has surely something to do with domestic reasons, but it is also indicative of a more general trend that might be related to the economic crisis as well. The trends over time are also similar to those concerning trust in the country's parliament. In particular, we see a strong decrease of trust in Italy and Spain, but to some extent also in the UK and increasing levels of trust in Sweden and Switzerland. Recurring corruption scandals in the two Southern European countries, but to some extent also the expenses scandal in the UK are probably not alien to this decline in political trust in those countries.

Finally, we can take a look at how European citizens score with regards to political efficacy or, better, feelings of political efficacy. Political scientists usually distinguish between internal and external political efficacy. The former refers to the belief that one can understand politics and therefore participate in politics, while the latter relates to whether one believes that the government will respond to one's demands (Balch 1974). A lack of external efficacy is sometimes also referred to as political cynicism (Agger et al. 1961). Here we use two indicators of internal efficacy: one referring to the extent to which people believe that politics is too complicated to understand and another concerning the degree of difficulty for making up one's mind about political issues.

Table 2.8 shows the percentages of people in our seven countries who consider politics to be too complicated to understand, respectively who find it either difficult or very difficult to make up their mind about political issues. In both cases, higher percentages indicate lower levels of internal political efficacy. Unfortunately, data are missing for the 2010–14 period. Yet, the available data are sufficient to see that, in terms of finding politics too complicated, the British, Italians, and Spanish citizens feel the most powerless – in the sense of displaying a lower level of political efficacy – while the Swedes and the Swiss, but also the Belgians and the Dutch, show a higher level of political efficacy. The distributions and ranking are slightly different when it comes to making up one's mind about political issues, but Italy and Spain – and, here, also Belgium and to some extent Sweden – show once again lower political efficacy, while the Netherlands and Switzerland – and, here, also the UK – are characterized by higher political efficacy. Given the missing data for the more recent period, we do not consider trends over time here.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter we have sketched a portrait of European citizens with a focus on their potential for mobilization in different forms of political participation, mobilizing structures, political values, and key political attitudes. Such a portrait shows important cross-national variations as well as certain common patterns. In particular, the two Southern European countries seem to stand out when we look at the protest potential and other key aspects by means of the ESS data. First, Italian and Spanish citizens show a larger protest potential than their

TABLE 2.8. *Internal political efficacy, 2002–2014 (percentages)*

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	Total
Politics too complicated to understand (regularly and frequently) (%)								
Belgium	36.1	37.0	33.1	40.0	–	–	–	36.5
Italy	40.1	41.4	–	–	–	–	–	40.8
Netherlands	32.2	36.5	34.2	32.0	–	–	–	33.7
Spain	42.2	43.2	41.3	39.1	–	–	–	41.2
Sweden	27.4	29.7	24.4	28.1	–	–	–	27.4
Switzerland	28.9	30.7	32.2	29.1	–	–	–	30.2
UK	40.7	42.5	41.6	39.5	–	–	–	41.0
Making up mind about political issues (difficult and very difficult) (%)								
Belgium	44.2	47.4	43.8	48.2	–	–	–	45.9
Italy	55.1	47.8	–	–	–	–	–	51.0
Netherlands	34.3	38.5	37.0	32.6	–	–	–	35.6
Spain	39.6	42.2	49.1	44.3	–	–	–	44.0
Sweden	40.3	44.4	41.1	39.9	–	–	–	41.4
Switzerland	26.1	33.4	33.8	32.8	–	–	–	31.4
UK	29.6	35.2	33.0	31.4	–	–	–	32.2

Note: Design weight has been applied.
Source: ESS (cumulative dataset).

counterparts in the other countries, especially when it comes to participating in demonstrations, while they are less active in less confrontational political activities such as petitioning or more innovative ones such as boycotting i.e. political consumerism. Second, Italy and Spain also display the strongest support for leftist values and at the same time systematically lower levels of political interest and trust, as well as a narrower satisfaction with democracy, relative to the other countries, suggesting a higher degree of alienation from the political system. Furthermore, Italians and Spaniards have become increasingly alienated from institutional politics in recent years, while citizens in other countries – Switzerland above all – have remained more attached or have become even more satisfied with democracy and trusting of their political institutions.

The described patterns and trends should be taken with a grain of salt, however. As comparativists are well aware of, concepts do not always travel easily from one country to another. In other words, descriptive cross-national comparisons like the one conducted in this chapter face the well-known problem of equivalence (van Deth 1998): the same concept might have different meanings in different contexts. Likewise, the meaning of the indicators we examined here may vary across countries suggesting that similarities or variations observed could be at least in part the product of varying interpretations. However, the ESS is an internationally recognized survey and the questions analyzed here have all been validated and used many times previously by numerous studies in the political science literature, and as such these concerns should be minimal here. Moreover, these issues are further reduced by the fact that we are considering seven countries that belong to a relatively homogeneous space: they are all Western European democracies, most of which belong to the European Union, except for Switzerland. We therefore trust that the patterns and trends we observed reflect real similarities and differences, and therefore form a strong basis for informing the analyses of the protest survey data shown in the chapters to follow.

Notes

1. See www.europeansocialsurvey.org for further details on the data.
2. While we are considering each on its own terms, research on political participation often sees these specific political activities, and others, as items composing broad forms of participation (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Dalton 2008; Milbrath 1965; Teorell et al. 2007; van Deth 2016). In this vein, Teorell al al. (2007) distinguish between five main forms depending on whether they are exit-based or voice-based, representational or extra-representational, and targeted or non-targeted: voting, party activities, contacting, consumer participation, and protest activity.
3. The ESS is conducted every two years and the data are available for the years from 2002 to 2016 inclusive. Here, however, we only include data up to 2014, as our sample covers demonstrations occurring between 2009 and 2013. In some cases a given question was not included in certain rounds. Most importantly, Italy did not take part in most of the rounds, so that we only have data for 2002, 2004, and 2012 for this country.

4. The lower turnout in Switzerland may also be explained by the traditionally consensual character of Swiss politics and by the presence of instruments of direct democracy (popular initiatives and referenda), which may strip national elections of a part of their relevance, hence leading to lower electoral participation (Freitag and Stadelmann-Steffen 2010; but see Ladner and Fiechter 2012 for opposite evidence).
5. It should be noted that the missing data for the 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2014 rounds of the ESS might lead to an underestimation of the protest potential in Italy.
6. It should be noted that the figures for Switzerland might overestimate the actual usage of this form of participation as direct democratic instruments also require signing in much the same way as for petitions, only with a binding effect on political authorities that petitions do not have.
7. Here we chose to show the percentages for these two categories of possible answers: at least once a month and at least once a week. We consider this to reflect a strong involvement.
8. Unfortunately, this is a rather poor indicator of membership as it is unclear what is meant by "similar organizations." So, one does not know whether this refers to other labor movement organizations or to something else. Yet, given the figures, chances are high that most of the respondents have interpreted this as referring to labor movement organizations.
9. We should stress that, by definition, values cannot be observed directly through survey questions as they are non-observable conceptions of the desirable engaging moral considerations (van Deth and Scarbrough 1995). The use of the two direct questions, however, is sufficient for the purpose of the present chapter.